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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1268 
________________ 
 
 
MANUEL AHMED ABDALE PIZARRO, 
           Petitioner 
 
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent 
 
     ________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
(No. A087-099-885) 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 20, 2017) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Manuel Abdale Pizarro asks us to reverse the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) denial of a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility. We are without jurisdiction to 
do so and thus dismiss his petition with respect to the BIA’s exercise of discretion and 
deny it with respect to all other issues raised. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Cospito v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008). 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Pizarro first entered the United States in 1987. He later married and now has six 
children, all of whom are United States citizens. Between 2002 and 2009, Pizarro worked 
as a mortgage loan officer. In 2009, he was indicted on wire fraud charges for overstating 
borrowers’ incomes on two mortgage loan applications. Pizarro pled guilty and the Court 
sentenced him to spend 366 days in prison and to pay $370,000 as compensation for the 
loss caused by the two mortgage loan foreclosures. 
 The wire-fraud conviction set in play a downward spiral for Pizarro. Fearing 
prison, he obtained $13,000 from an acquaintance, which he claims he planned to pay 
back (the record is not clear precisely how he came by the money), and absconded to 
Ecuador. Pizarro reentered the United States by crossing the southern border without 
authorization in 2013 and was apprehended a year later. He was subsequently convicted 
of failing to appear to serve his initial wire-fraud sentence as well as embezzling the 
$13,000. 
 In 2015 the Government began proceedings to remove Pizarro from the United 
States as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). To avoid deportation, he requested an adjustment of status, 
and it is undisputed that he cannot obtain the relief he requests without the grant of a 
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to INA § 212(h). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
 Under INA § 212(h) waivers may be granted, among other reasons, if removal 
would result in “extreme hardship” for citizens or permanent-residents who are members 
of the petitioner’s immediate family. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Whether to grant a waiver 
of inadmissibility is left to the discretion of the Attorney General, but immigrants who 
were “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” in the United States before being 
“convicted of an aggravated felony” are statutorily ineligible for a waiver. Id. 
 The Immigration Judge assigned to Pizarro’s case held both that he was statutorily 
ineligible for a waiver and that, even if he were eligible, the IJ would exercise his 
discretion to deny the waiver because Pizarro’s criminal record outweighed the hardship 
his family would suffer from his deportation. J.A. 16–19. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial 
on the latter ground only. J.A. 4. Pizarro filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA 
denied. He appeals that denial. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 The IJ held Pizarro had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence before he 
committed an aggravated felony (i.e., wire fraud) and was thus statutorily ineligible for a 
waiver of inadmissibility per INA § 212(h). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Pizarro disagrees, 
arguing that because he initially entered the United States on a tourist visa he does not 
trigger the statute’s ineligibility provision. We do not reach this issue, however, because 
4 
 
the BIA affirmed the IJ on the independent ground that Pizarro does not merit a waiver of 
inadmissibility as a matter of discretion. 
 Pizarro also takes issue with this second ground for denial of his waiver request. 
He disagrees with the IJ and BIA’s balancing of the relevant factors in his case that bear 
on whether a discretionary waiver should issue. But Congress has decreed that “our 
jurisdiction does not extend to an agency’s factual and discretionary determinations 
underlying the denial of waivers based on an analysis involving extreme hardship.” 
Cospito, 539 F.3d at 170; accord 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Thus we cannot second-
guess whether Pizarro’s particular circumstances warrant a waiver. 
 Finally, Pizarro contends that the IJ applied the wrong standard, requiring him to 
demonstrate that his deportation would lead his family to suffer not merely “extreme 
hardship” but “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Compare 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(h)(1)(B) with Pet’r’s Br. at 20–21. But this contention finds no support in the 
record, which shows the IJ applied the appropriate “extreme hardship” standard. See J.A. 
16–19. 
* * * * * 
 Regardless whether the IJ was correct that Pizarro is statutorily barred from 
receiving a waiver of inadmissibility, the IJ and BIA also determined that he should not 
receive one as a matter of discretion. The record demonstrates that they applied the 
proper standard to Pizarro’s request, and we lack jurisdiction to review their exercise of 
discretion. Accordingly, we dismiss Pizarro’s petition for review with respect to that 
exercise of discretion and deny it with respect to all other issues. 
